Committee: DISEC
Topic: Autonomous weapons and AI in warfare.
Chair: Natalia Nuñez Garza
Moderator: Rodrigo Ezqueda Saucedo

Overview of the problem

Artificial intelligence is a very powerful tool, with many uses, that has been developed and integrated into the society of almost every nation, taking responsibility for different fields like medicine, labour, arts, and other work. Helping people with their tasks and work, the use of this tool has made daily life easier in many aspects, and almost everyone is familiar with its use and has made it part of their life. The daily use of Artificial Intelligence has minor concerns, like whether it's environmentally harmful or whether it's making people dependent on it. Even though it is very useful in many aspects, there are other areas where there is still a discussion of where the international community should limit it, and whether it's morally correct, such as health, its excessive use in companies, education, news writing, and the most polemic example of this, "war". (UNIDIR, 2023; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs [UNODA], 2024).

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) have been a concerning topic in warfare recently, in the form of military drones or military robots they are systems that operate with a little or not human control at all that can control them nor stop them immediately, causing numerous delegations to consider its potential and if it should be banned or not. The growing production of them has made it a priority to address. While some delegations, like Russia, argue that there is not enough evidence to prove that new regulations or restrictions should be applied to autonomous weapons, the Iberoamerican Bloc thinks that they should be banned or strictly restricted, and some countries like Spain, Italy, Canada, the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea think that there should be a prohibition of uncontrollable systems while regulating other Autonomous Weapons Systems. (ICRC, 2017; UN SG, 2024). LAWS work by the activation made by a human user, it is designed to process data so it can select targets without any human intervention, Artificial Intelligence is being given a growing number

of responsibilities in military affairs, from intelligence analysis and target identification to drone operations and cyber-attacks (ICRC, 2017; Goncharuk, 2024; United Nations, 2026), while the advantages of the use of this technology are the efficiency of it, the faster resolution of conflicts, not having to risk the life of civilians, reducing the exposure of civilians on combat zones, and using Artificial Intelligence to reduce the damages of war, meanwhile the disadvantages are that those systems can be unpredictable if they're not being controlled by someone, it increases the risk of error and miscalculation. (UN SG, 2024; UNIDIR, 2023).

In current times, the advance in the development of new technologies in different fields is progressing every day, having the potential to design sophisticated weapons that work without human intervention, which means that they are weapon systems that, once activated, can identify, select, and engage targets with lethal force without someone having to control them (ICRC, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2025). But there are a plethora of questions about it: whether it's ethical, what would be done if it goes out of control, and whether it's morally right to eliminate objectives with LAWS?

AI has been supporting humans since its inception, but when does it reach the moral and ethical limit?

Introduction

The DISEC committee deals with Disarmament, global challenges, and threats to peace that affect international peace. The committee's main subject is to address the challenges that come with armed conflicts and the possible solutions to each of the problems, considering the benefit of everyone. Right now, they have been working on a matter that concerns every delegation, with its rapid increase and its unmeasured power: “Autonomous Weapons and AI in Warfare”. The topic presented is the central part of the debate that is going to be held.

The use of Artificial intelligence has been in discussion for at least 70 years: whether it was ethical, whether it was taking people's jobs, whether it was making life easier, or whether it was making people more indolent and too comfortable; now, there is a discussion of a more dangerous and controversial issue: artificial intelligence in warfare (UNIDIR, 2023; UNODA, 2024).

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, also known as “LAWS,” is something that has become a topic of discussion in the United Nations recently, and it’s very important to address this issue because it involves risking lives, whether member states choose to prohibit it or let it go without any restriction, with both outcomes being fatal if they don’t reach an agreement. Even though it is so important to address, it is still controversial because there is a need to consider the legal, ethical, and technological dimensions. (UN SG, 2024; ICRC ,2021).

Numerous organizations have been involved in this theme, providing support and initiatives to address the challenges of LAWS, such as UNESCO, UNIDIR, and others who are currently involved with it. (Richard, 2026).

Panelists discussed what States and multilateral processes can do across the national and multilateral levels. At the national level, Zena Assaad pushed back on what she called “fabricated urgency.” Dr. Assaad observed: “We have this AI arms race that has promoted a great part of the accelerated acquisition and procurement processes. What states need to do is to just slow down and allow the time for these very necessary practices.” (Assaad, 2026)

The experts agreed that it is important that the questions asked are technically correct and independence should be ensured, especially from companies developing and selling the systems being evaluated, and needs to be maintained. At the multilateral level, panelists called for a technically informed classification, a shared policy framework States could operationalize, and a more homogeneous approach across forums, using previous conversations instead of new forums where they re-explain the same terminology in different contexts.

Several panelists also raised a prior question: whether AI is the right tool for a given task in the first place. “Multilateral discussions often start from the false premise that AI technologies are much more capable than they are, and that AI models are a given inevitability in all military systems,” said Khlaaf. Some panelists argued that the policy community should preserve the option of declining specific applications, rather than treating AI integration as a foregone conclusion. (Richard, 2026).

The committee’s main objective is to examine the moral limitations of the use of AI in warfare, find ways to address the difficulties that come with the use of this tool, and establish what the needed limitations and restrictions are that should be used to address the problems and guarantee a safe use of Artificial Intelligence during armed conflicts.

During the following pages of the background paper, the delegate will have the opportunity to be able to understand how the problem has been affecting the global population, what is the historical background of the problem and where it originated,

how governments and companies have developed the use of Lethal Autonomous Weapons during recent years, the main reasons of why the problem hasn’t concluded, and crucial information that will assist the delegates to understand the topic and will aid them during the writing of their position paper.

Historical Background

This issue has affected the world for an extended period, since 1991, when this technology was first used. Operation Desert Storm was the pioneer, in which missiles used Artificial Intelligence, carrying multiple sensors using FLIR (forward-looking infrared) thermal imaging that detected heat radiation, and GPS technology, flying more than a hundred miles while being guided remotely by human operators that are meant to manipulate the machines, while the missiles did not have full AI autonomy, they had a big impact on navigation and targeting systems development. (Collins, 2026)

Since 1980, the CCW (Certain Conventional Weapons) has been in effect, which provides a framework of restrictions or prohibitions on certain weapons that are considered injurious to the population (ICRC, 2014). In 2013, discussions at the UN started increasing about autonomous weapons that could be targeted without any human intervention, noting that the next year would be a formal discussion of the emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons (Knuckey, 2014; Gill, 2018). In 2014, this convention became the international forum for discussing the use and restrictions of LAWS (UNODA, 2014; Knuckey, 2014). In 2016, they continued debating the role of autonomous weapons, risks, and appropriate usage of them. In 2017, the GGE (Group of Governmental Experts) process held an important discussion on emerging technologies within LAWS (United Nations, 2017). Then, in 2020, the use of autonomous drones in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was seen in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which used an autonomous ARM (anti-radiation missile) that detected, tracked, and attacked radars and electronic equipment, such as communication systems, from the opponent, playing a critical role in suppressing enemy air defenses (SEAD) that left the opponent disadvantaged; it is not fully proven that LAWS were used (Khachatryan, 2024).

In 2022, the war between Ukraine and Russia drew international attention to LAWS weapons because they showed attempts to use AI drones as the conflict dragged on when communication systems were failing; these developments have raised concerns about the potential spread of autonomous functions in ongoing conflicts (Goncharuk, 2024). This same year, in 2022, the Human Rights Council, in resolution 51/22, requested that the advisory committee prepare a study examining the human rights implications of new and emerging technologies in the military area, also requesting to seek and take into account relevant work already done by stakeholders including the United States, UN agencies, entities, funds and programmes (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2022). Following this resolution, in 2023 the General Assembly adopted resolution 78/241 on LAWS; this resolution recognized the need to deal with the humanitarian, legal, ethical, and security issues related to autonomous weapons. It also promoted further international work seeking views from states and stakeholders on the issue, and requested the invitation of international agencies such as the Red Cross, civil society, and the scientific community (UNGA, 2023). Following the last resolution, in 2024 the General Assembly adopted the 79/62 Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems resolution, which encouraged the international debate and promoted active participation in the CCW process (UNGA A/79/88, 2024). The large number of votes (166 votes) demonstrated support for further work on the issue, although not all countries agreed on a specific treaty or legal solution; noting that the group of environmental experts on CCW completed its work in 2023 and completed its work as soon as possible in 2025, ideally. Following up on this resolution in 2025, the General Assembly adopted 80/57, which called for work toward completing elements of a possible international instrument, with the possibility of future negotiations (UNGA, 2025). However, even after considering it, it wasn't enough to establish a comprehensive negotiation to manage autonomous weapons. The CCW meets this year, where it focuses on possible factors, including how LAWS should be characterized, restricted, and how to maintain human judgment and control within them. The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) is expected to hold its seventh review conference, which is scheduled for November 16th, 2026 (UNODA, 2026).

As seen in the resolution and history of the LAWS and CCW conventions between the countries and the General Assembly, there have been multiple negotiations to develop a legal solution; however, several problems remain unsolved, and countries continue to disagree about the meaning of human control in autonomous weapons. As a result, international discussions have made some progress, but countries have not signed a global treaty that regulates or prohibits LAWS.

The situation today

Right now, the theme is still being discussed, with many delegations asking if the selection and elimination of targets should be in the hands of automation, and others seeing it as a useful tool that can help small countries in war. Also, there are many considerations that need to be taken to reach a conclusion that tells the delegations what to do with the problems and benefits that come with the application of AI in warfare (UNODA, 2026; UN 2026).

Germany and Ukraine launched the Brave Germany initiative in May 2026. This initiative aims to aid developments in defence tech and innovative start-ups. This includes unmanned technology, AI, laser, communications, and missile tech. Later, in September 2026, Germany entered mass production of over 5,000 AI-guided medium- and long-range strike drones for Ukraine. This shows how important AI and drone technology is becoming in modern warfare. However, AI-guided drones do not necessarily fall under LAWS. There is a significant difference between the ability to assist through navigation and engaging targets without human intervention. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2026) (Simsek, 2026).

People could already notice the change during 2024, when it became obvious in Ukraine that drones would be a big part of future wars and that Western dependence on a global drone industry dominated by China and other potential adversaries posed significant strategic risks. This case also demonstrated that effective drone warfare requires advanced AI systems as well as real-time, and highly effective, feedback between combat units, AI, and the drone industry (Goncharuk, 2024; Andersson & Simon, 2024).

UNODA identified several future areas of work under the MAPS Dialogues, including in-depth discussions to build a common understanding of opportunities and risks, potential red lines (such as in relation to disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation regimes), and diplomatic tools to support dialogue among States. To

this end, UNODA is currently seeking funding for the 2026 MAPS Dialogue (UNODA, 2026; Richard, 2026).

When the theme was discussed at the UN, many delegations agreed that even though AI is a tool that can be used in warfare, “we can’t get rid of human control under any circumstances”; however, they haven't come to a final resolution on this problem, and AI is still being used in different wars. With many countries wanting their dissolution and as many countries wanting its control, it's hard to get to an agreement (UNGA, 2026; UN, 2026).

There is no stance in the Global South on autonomous weapons; however, many developing nations are calling for more international regulations to be put in place, as they are concerned about civilian safety, accountability, and the increasing divide between rich and poor nations in terms of technology.
In Africa, the African Group has supported a mixed approach to LAWS. The group has supported the view that humans must still have real control over the decisions related to the use of force. They have also supported technology transfer and technical assistance so developing nations can be involved in decisions about these technologies (United Nations, 2026).

In Latin America, countries including Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay have all supported more international regulation. These countries signed a statement on the 22nd October 2026 along with 50 other countries. This statement said that the 2026 GGE report provided a basis for negotiations of an international instrument on LAWS (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2026).

Key Stakeholders and Their Positions

Countries:

United States of America: The USA believes that weapons that can be uncontrollable or highly dangerous should have restrictions or be completely prohibited. The ones that don't represent an immediate danger don't need any restrictions (UNSG, 2024).

Russian Federation: Russia supports the development and use of Lethal Autonomous Weapons, under the regulation of international human rights, but opposes the creation of specific regulations or prohibitions (UNSG, 2024).

China: The People's Republic of China supports the idea that autonomous weapons are the new revolution in military affairs. Anyway, the delegation of China agrees that the ones that are controlled should be used with responsibility and prudence (UNSG, 2024).

United Kingdom: The United Kingdom is leading efforts to have management and control of Artificial Intelligence; they defend the ethical use of Autonomous Weapons and that they should be used in an Ambitious, Safe and Responsible manner (UNSG, 2024).

France: France has stated that LAWS that can’t work with international laws should be banned, while, partially, LAWS should be regulated. In the past, it has supported negotiation of an additional protocol to the CCW, and also supported creating a committee of technical experts (UNSG, 2024).

Pakistan: The country of Pakistan shows strong favor of a binding instrument; believes new international legal rules are needed. Wants to ban weapons that cannot function without human involvement and do not follow International Humanitarian Law. Has proposed a new binding Protocol VI to the CCW, which includes banning, oversight by humans, limitations to targeting, accountability, and investigation (UNSG, 2024).

Israel: In favor of current international law, keeping in mind that LAWS have benefits and risks. They believe current International Humanitarian Law is enough. Do not want to introduce a new binding International treaty. Stating that weapons should be judged by their capabilities and circumstances. Supports discussions taking place within the CCW GGE 8 (UNSG, 2024).

North Korea: Against a binding instrument; doesn't support negotiations for a binding agreement. Voted against the UN GA resolution 80/57 in 2025 and voted against the draft LAWS resolution within the First Committee in August 2026 (Automated Decision Research, n.d.; UNGA, 2025).

Iran: Does not have an official statement regarding whether they support negotiations for a binding treaty, but they are part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) who are in favour of a new Binding Treaty. The Iranian representatives have been involved in some discussions within the CCW; however, Iran is not a party to the convention. Abstained from voting on the UN GA resolution 80/57 in 2025 and the draft resolution with the First Committee in August 2026 (Automated Decision Research, n.d.; UNGA, 2025).

Ukraine: Supports international regulation but has no official stance on a treaty. Ukraine supports international discussions and the creation of rules based on International Humanitarian Law. In 2025, said the CCW rolling text was a good foundation for an international instrument. In August 2026, they stated they supported the rolling text as a foundation for an international outcome. Have pointed out the importance of protecting the people and ensuring that military technology must follow the laws of International

Humanitarian Law and consider realistic solutions on the battlefield. Supported the UN GA resolution 78/241 in 2023 (Automated Decision Research, n.d.; UNGA, 2023).

Japan: In favour of controls but not a binding treaty; wants to ban systems that cannot follow International Humanitarian Law or have no human involvement at all. However, it has specifically stated that future international regulations should not be binding, but effective regulations created by an agreement. Involved in discussions within the CCW. Wanting weapons to be reviewed under Article thirty-six of the First Additional Protocol. They have plans to create training programmes for the correct use of AI. Prioritising keeping security within the military, human judgement, and humanitarian protection (UNSG, 2024).

International Organizations:

UNODA has supported the UN's disarmament work since 2018. The UN Secretary-General has argued that LAWS without human control are unethical and politically unacceptable and should be banned internationally, and the CCW is progressing. It helps provide the setting in which states discuss LAWS and consider possible international approaches (UNODA, 2023; UNSG, 2024)

The International Committee of the Red Cross works to protect people affected by armed conflict and promote international humanitarian law. It advocates new binding regulations to ban unacceptable LAWS and to regulate other systems. The suggestions were to ban systems with unpredictable and uncertain effects and those targeting humans. Other LAWS should have limitations around what they are targeting. (ICRC, 2021, 2026).

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) carries out research into international security and disarmament. This helps to aid policymakers with an understanding of the technology, types of autonomy, and potential legal and policy solutions. With its new Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security platform, it helps connect with investors from all around the world to strengthen collaboration and help

turn global discussions on AI and Security into practical consequences (UNIDIR, 2023, 2026).

Non-Profit organizations:

Stop Killer Robots is an international organization that wants a legally binding treaty on LAWS. They believe humans should retain some control over the use of force, and some systems shouldn't be allowed. This group increases awareness of the humanitarian, legal, and ethical issues surrounding autonomous weapons. They also encourage the government to work towards international regulations (Human Rights Watch, 2025).

Companies involved in the development of software, sensor technology, and military technology may be impacted by new regulations internationally. Such as proving it's safe, reliable, well documented, and implemented. Businesses will also be concerned about liability in relation to the misuse of their products causing damage. States will have obligations to follow internationally, so it's important to consider the facts of the situation and relevant law to determine whether the manufacturer has an obligation (Toh & Ayoub, 2026; Richard, 2026). As many AI technologies can be used in both civilian and military contexts, care needs to be taken when imposing any limitations. Any restrictions on weapons within the military should not stop positive research within the civilian sector and a peaceful use of AI (UNODA, 2024; UNSG, 2024).

If soldiers are using systems that they cannot fully understand or control, there will be new risks involved. However, there can be benefits from them being able to use technology to help them do tasks. It is important to ensure the system can be properly tested and that there are clearly defined rules. Having weapons in operation in areas of conflict will cause concern for civilians. If the weapon makes a mistake, the wrong decision could be made, and innocent people could be harmed. They will need some information and accountability. An effective international system would consider these issues facing these communities. (ICRC 2021; UNSG, 2024).

Past Attempts and Existing Frameworks

The population has seen the problem of Lethal Autonomous weapons as a possibility in the future since 1970, when people imagined a dystopia where AI took charge of everything, including war, where machines were the ones in charge of targeting and eliminating targets. But that was all it was: a far-away possibility that, right now, was only to entertain people in the cinema. But with the advance of technology, AI became a vital part of life, helping companies, civilians, and governments to make work easier, helping the members of society to do things faster and more efficiently, without having to worry about it too much, but some people started using it too much, in areas where people didn't know if it was ethical to use, and what was once a scenario in the future was now the reality. It wasn't until 2012 and 2013 that they started discussing the problem at the human rights forums in Geneva, where they started raising awareness and discussing the consequences of LAWS being used as a tool in warfare (Knuckey, 2014; Gill, 2018). The CCW turned out to be the forum of choice to discuss the technologies that were emerging and how they would control them if they ever affected our lives, between 2014 and 2016. The Informal Meeting of Experts, led first by Ambassador Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel of France and later by Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany, “raised awareness of the complex dimensions of the issue—humanitarian, ethical, military, legal, and techno-commercial” (UNODA, 2014; Jenks & Ford, 2016; ICRC, 2017).

In 2017, a letter from the Future Life Institute at the United Nations, which was also signed by 126 CEOs and founders of artificial intelligence corporations, implored states to stop the autonomous weapons competition. In 2023, officials met to discuss the issues of autonomous weapons systems, yet a uniform agreement on how they should be regulated on an international level was not reached (UNIDIR, 2023; UNGA, 2024)

Delegates at the UN's 80th General Assembly recognised that AI could, if responsibly used, support humanitarian protection rather than undermine it. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Affairs (UNIDIR) highlights in a report how AI applications could help militaries better uphold the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution.

On September 24th, 2025, the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy cautioned: "It is only a matter of time before drones are fighting drones, attacking critical infrastructure and targeting people fully autonomously – all by themselves … no humans involved." (Zelenskyy, V. 2025)

The General Assembly's resolution 79/62, adopted in December 2024, had already affirmed that international law applies throughout the life cycle of military AI. The Secretary-General's June 2025 follow-up report compiled inputs from Member States, civil society and technical experts, reflecting broad concern that unchecked AI could destabilise global security and erode humanitarian protection (UNGA A/79/88, 2024; UNSG, 2024).

"The question," Guterres told the high-level meeting launching the Global Dialogue on AI Governance on 25 September, "is whether we will govern this transformation together — or let it govern us."

Challenges and Complications

Each country will have different security priorities and technological capabilities. Some governments have different thoughts about having a new legal agreement, while some countries would rather use existing legislation and voluntary guidelines.

It is important to clearly define what LAWS is. If the definition is too general, it may include weapons with minimal automation. If, however, it is too specific, it may not include weapons with minimal human involvement.

In cases where an autonomous weapon causes unlawful harm, it may be necessary to look at the decisions made by commanders, actions taken by operators, actions by the state, and how the system was developed and tested. This doesn't mean that people would assume that the system can be blamed. A framework could be introduced in the future stating any documentation, investigation, training, and national accountability requirements.

Countries must have confidence in the regulations within the treaty being followed. Countries may be unwilling to give technical information; however, any global monitoring should be balanced with taking into consideration their security issues. This may include requirements to submit reports, national verification of weapons, data sharing, and cooperation. Delegates will need to consider how practical these requirements would be.

AI can be unreliable as it can behave differently in various scenarios depending on the quality of the data, environmental factors, and design. Although not every AI system will be unpredictable, the government must have ways to understand the risk and whether the weapon can be used safely and lawfully in the anticipated situations. Therefore, regulations should take into account what limitations there are with the system and what risks could be anticipated.

There is a risk that countries will feel they are at a disadvantage by restricting their development and wish to invest in military AI. The risk can be reduced by establishing a common goal or expectations through international cooperation. However, it may be difficult to achieve any agreements if countries feel they would be at a great disadvantage by cooperating.

Countries will have varying resources to research, test, and monitor their military technology. Some countries may have high capabilities to develop highly sophisticated systems, but there will also be countries that lack the technical capability to accurately evaluate their technology. International collaboration can provide technical assistance and set common standards, allowing countries with fewer resources to fully engage in the discussion and implementation of new agreements.

Many of the technologies available within AI can be applied to both civilian and military purposes. This can cause issues for legislators when attempting to regulate military weaponry, as this could cause an impact on peaceful research. Consideration should be taken by delegates of the difference between using AI technology and the actual function of the weapon. International legislation should focus on the risks of weapon systems rather than unfairly restrict beneficial civilian technologies.

Charles Ferguson argues that the development of drone technologies is transforming modern warfare (Ferguson, 2025). He explains how, due to the increased importance of Ukrainian technology firms and the rapid development of military drones, tanks and other expensive weapons can become increasingly vulnerable. He also highlights how, due to the integration of AI, future drone warfare will become a major factor in future warfare.

The Committee's Role and Powers

DISEC addresses disarmament and international security issues within the UN General Assembly. Its work focuses on discussion, recommendations, and the development of international approaches to security challenges (UN, n.d.).

For autonomous weapons, delegates should examine how possible rules could protect civilians, reduce the danger of an arms race, and preserve meaningful human control (UNODA, 2024; ICRC, 2021).

Recommendations DISEC could include:

- Support negotiations on a legally binding instrument.
- Have clear minimum standards for meaningful human control.
- Prohibit or limit the use of autonomous weapons where there are unacceptable humanitarian risks.
- Improve National inspection of new LAWS.
- Increase transparency and information sharing.
- Have processes in place to investigate and hold responsible.
- Offer technical support to countries without resources to evaluate AI-based weapons.
- Encourage collaboration between states, UN Agencies, Humanitarian groups, scientists, and technologists.

These are just some ideas around what could be included in policymaking. It hasn't been adopted by DISEC (UNSG, 2024; UNODA, 2024).

DISEC cannot enforce any of these policies on a country; they will need to be negotiated individually. For instance, a new international treaty will need to be negotiated. DISEC can provide political support for future agreements and suggest the GA pursue further policies (UN n.d.).

Delegates must draft a resolution paper that will detail the final solution from the committee, agreeing on one solution.

For this topic, it is important to avoid generic statements about promoting peace or responsible technology. Consider specific proposals such as: considering concrete proposals such as national review of weapons, reporting procedures, creating standards for human controls, or negotiations on international legal rules (UNSG, 2024; ICRC, 2021).

Guiding Questions for Debate

Use these questions to help prepare for the committee.

1. Should certain LAWS be completely prohibited, regulated by treaty, or are they already regulated by international law and national policy?
2. What should be required for meaningful human control over selecting and engaging targets?
3. Should weapons that target humans without meaningful human control be prohibited? How would they be defined?
4. Who should be accountable for unlawful damage caused by LAWS? What accountability factors should be included in any future agreement?
5. What techniques can be used to ensure that international rules are being followed without having to disclose sensitive military information?
6. How can the international community ensure that there is less risk of an arms race with AI but still allow countries to address their legitimate security concerns?
7. Should there be rules between defensive autonomous weapons and offensive autonomous weapons? How can they be defined?
8. How will international law and any future regulation apply to AI systems that are used to aid human decision-making but not select and engage targets?
9. What support (technological and financial) should be provided to countries that don't have the resources to assess autonomous weapons and follow future international rules?
10. Should international rules be put in place to ensure that autonomous weapons technology is not transferred to other states or non-state armed groups? How can this be done consistently?
11. If major military powers do not participate in a new treaty, what other measures can countries take to promote responsible behaviour and reduce humanitarian risk?
12. How can governments ensure LAWS are compliant with International Humanitarian Law and protect civilian populations?

Conclusion and Call to Action

Autonomous Weapons and Artificial Intelligence in warfare are a major challenge for international peace and security. The issue brings up many questions that need to be answered regarding the protection of civilians and responsibility. Although international humanitarian law already exists in relation to autonomous weapons, governments are still divided on whether further regulations on autonomous weapons should be implemented. Although there are UN resolutions in place and negotiations taking place within the CCW, a global treaty has yet to be reached (UNSG, 2024; UNGA, 2024, 2025; UNODA, 2026).

International consideration should be given to how to prevent unacceptable damage while also taking into account the security issues of individual countries. For it to be successfully implemented, cooperation is required from government organisations, international organisations, humanitarian organisations, and researchers (ICRC 2021, 2026; UNIDIR, 2026).

The delegates can make a meaningful difference by suggesting realistic solutions to ensure civilians are safe, humans can be held accountable, more transparency can be achieved, and the chances of an arms race globally are reduced. The delegations must also understand that different countries may have different opinions on what would be the best solution.

Regulations are put in place to ensure human life, international laws, and accountability when developing technology. While debating, the delegations also consider that international collaboration can help inform future generations.

“By far, the greatest danger of Artificial Intelligence is that people conclude too early that they understand it”.

-Eliezer Yudkowsky

References

Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law. (2014). *1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons*. Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja. https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/1980-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons-icrc-eng.pdf

Andersson, J. J., & Simon, S. (2024). *Minding the drone gap: Drone warfare and the EU* (Brief N.º 12). Instituto de Estudios de Seguridad de la Unión Europea. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/minding-drone-gap-drone-warfare-and-eu

Assaad, Z. (2026). *Panellist contribution* [Panel presentation]. UNIDIR Annual Cyber Stability Conference: Building a Secure and Peaceful Cyberspace, Geneva, Switzerland. https://unidir.org/

Automated Decision Research. (2023a). *Iran's state positions*. https://automatedresearch.org/news/state_position/iran/

Automated Decision Research. (2023b). *North Korea's state positions*. https://automatedresearch.org/news/state_position/democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea

Develice, L., & Comer, O. (2026). *Disarmament and International Security Committee: Regulating development of autonomous weapons and AI in warfare* (27-DISEC). Harvard National Model United Nations. https://www.hnmun.org/27disec

Defence. (2025). *Anti-radiation missiles: The silent hunters of modern warfare*. Aviation & Defense Market Reports. https://aviationanddefensemarketreports.com/anti-radiation-missiles-the-silent-hunters-of-modern-warfare/

Desmarais, A. (2026). *Europe accelerates its military career with AI: 5,000 drones and new smart warfare systems*. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/

Effoduh, J. O. (2021). *Weapons powered by artificial intelligence pose a frontier risk and need to be regulated*. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/emerging-technologies/the-accelerating-development-of-weapons-powered-by-artificial-risk-is-a-risk-to-humanity

Ferguson, C. (2026). *Artificial intelligence is going to redefine war and who will be the military powers*. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/ais-rewiring-us-warfare-may-be-only-beginning-2026-10-30/

Gill, A. S. (2018). *The role of the United Nations in addressing emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems*. Naciones Unidas.

Goncharuk, V. (2024). *Russia's war in Ukraine: Artificial intelligence in defence of Ukraine*. International Centre for Defence and Security. https://icds.ee/en/russias-war-in-ukraine-artificial-intelligence-in-defence-of-ukraine/#_edn1

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2017). *Autonomous weapon systems: Implications of increasing autonomy in the critical functions of weapons*. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4283-autonomous-weapons-systems

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2021). *ICRC position on autonomous weapon systems*. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2026). *Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law: Selected issues*. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-international-humanitarian-law-selected-issues

Jenks, C., & Ford, C. (2016, 11 de abril). *The international discussion continues: 2016 CCW experts meeting on lethal autonomous weapons*. Just Security. https://www.justsecurity.org/30682/2016-ccw-experts-meeting-laws/

Khachatryan, D. (2024). *Beyond the drone hype: Unpacking Nagorno-Karabakh's real lessons*. EVN Report. https://evnreport.com/opinion/beyond-the-drone-hype-unpacking-nagorno-karabakhs-real-lessons/

Knuckey, S. (2014, 19 de mayo). *Governments conclude first (ever) debate on autonomous weapons: What happened and what's next*. Just Security. https://www.justsecurity.org/10518/autonomous-weapons-intergovernmental-meeting/

Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. (2026). *Ukraine and Germany launch Brave Germany, a joint programme for defence technology development*. https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/ukraina-ta-nimechchyna-zapuskaiut-brave-germany-spilnu-prohramu-dlia-rozvytku-oboronnykh-tekhnolohii

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2026). *United Nations General Assembly First Committee 2026 Cluster 4 joint statement on lethal autonomous weapon systems*. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/united-nations-general-assembly-first-committee-2026-cluster-4-joint-statement-on-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems

Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2014). *2014 Meeting of experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems*. Naciones Unidas. https://meetings.unoda.org/ccw-ime/convention-certain-conventional-weapons-informal-meeting-experts-2014

Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2024). *Artificial intelligence in the military domain*. Naciones Unidas.

Office of Disarmament Affairs. (2023). *Lethal autonomous weapons systems*. Naciones Unidas. https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/emerging-challenges/lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems

Office of Disarmament Affairs. (2026a). *Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons — Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems*. Naciones Unidas. https://meetings.unoda.org/ccw-/convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons-group-of-governmental-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-2026

Office of Disarmament Affairs. (2026b). *MAPS Dialogues - A shared vocabulary for military AI: Bridging technical understanding and political needs*. Naciones Unidas. https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/updates/maps-dialogues-shared-vocabulary-military-ai-bridging-technical-understanding-and-policy-needs

Peace and Security. (2025). *Key takeaways from the dialogues on Military AI, Peace and Security 2025*. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Peace and Security. (2026). *AI on track to 'crowd out' human decision-making in warfare*. UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/10/1168636

Regional Information Centre for Western Europe. (2025). *AI in conflict: Keeping humanity in control*. Naciones Unidas.

Richard, A. (2026, 14 de mayo). *Panellist contribution* [Panel presentation]. MAPS Dialogues: A Shared Vocabulary for Military AI, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Geneva, Switzerland. https://mapsdialogues.org/

Satti, A. A. (2024). *AI: The new paradigm of war*. Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania. https://www.asc.upenn.edu/research/centers/milton-wolf-seminar-media-and-diplomacy-8

Simsek, E. (2026). *Germany launches mass production of strike drones for Ukraine*. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/germany-launches-mass-production-of-strike-drones-for-ukraine/4047439

Stauffer, B. (2025). *A hazard to human rights: Autonomous weapons systems and digital decision-making*. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/04/28/a-hazard-to-human-rights/autonomous-weapons-systems-and-digital-decision-making

Toh, A., & Ayoub, E. (2026). *The business of military AI*. Brennan Center for Justice. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/business-military-ai

UNIDIR. (2023). *A transformative technology with myriad benefits and significant risks*. Instituto de las Naciones Unidas de Investigación sobre el Desarme. https://unidir.org/focus-area/artificial-intelligence/

UNIDIR. (2026). *UNIDIR's Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security*. Instituto de las Naciones Unidas de Investigación sobre el Desarme. https://unidir.org/unidir-centre-of-excellence-on-ai-peace-and-security/

United Nations. (2017). *Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS): Advanced version* (CCW/GGE.1/2017/CRP.1). https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_on_Certain_Conventional_Weapons_-Meeting_of_High_Contracting_Parties(2017)/2017_CCW_GGE.1_2017_CRP.1_Advanced_%2Bcorrected.pdf

United Nations. (2026). *1st Meeting - 1st Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2026* [Audio/Video transcript]. https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k1v/k1v0j4pvkd?utm_source

United Nations General Assembly. (2022). *Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 7 October 2022* (A/HRC/RES/51/22). https://docs.un.org/en/A/hrc/RES/51/22

United Nations General Assembly. (2023). *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 December 2023* (A/RES/78/241). https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/78/241

United Nations General Assembly. (2024a). *Lethal autonomous weapons systems: Report of the Secretary-General* (A/79/88). https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/88

United Nations General Assembly. (2024b). *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 December 2024* (A/RES/79/62). https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/79/62

United Nations General Assembly. (2025). *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 1 December 2025* (A/RES/80/57). https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/80/57

U.S. Department of Defense. (2019, 17 de enero). *Desert Storm: A look back*. https://www.war.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1728715/desert-storm-a-look-back/

Zelenskyy, V. (2025, 24 de septiembre). *Address by the President of Ukraine to the UN General Assembly* [Speech]. United Nations General Assembly High-Level Week, New York, NY, United States. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/watch-live-ukraines-zelenskyy-addresses-u-n-general-assembly